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INTRODUCTION
The debate over the right to refuse treatment predictably follows
several well-worn paths: doctrinal analyses of the underlying legal
principles that have informed the 25 years of litigation in this area;1
philosophical discourses about personhood and autonomy;2 clinical
studies of the impact of anti-psychotic medications on brain functioning;3 political polemics about the “intrusion” of law into the domain of psychiatry.4 Each of these has been the subject of extensive
writings in the legal, philosophical and behavioral literature.
But there has been surprisingly little literature about two of the
most important issues that affect the way the right to refuse treatment
is implemented in an institutional setting: the attitudes of the parties
concerned (patients and staff), and the adequacy of counsel that is
made available to patients seeking to invoke their constitutional right
to refuse. The lack of literature on these issues reflects, I believe, a
deeper issue: the extent to which we, as a society, trivialize what is at
stake in the right to refuse treatment litigation and trivialize the
personhood of those in institutions subject to such medications. It is
this deeper issue that I wish to address in this paper.
My title draws on Bob Dylan’s masterpiece, Shelter from the
Storm. In it, Dylan warns us of placing our trust in those who offer us
such shelter in a variety of life situations. In the penultimate verse, he
sings:
In a little hilltop village, they gambled for my clothes . . . I offered up my innocence and got repaid with scorn, “come in,”
she said, “I’ll give you shelter from the storm.”5
The critic Tim Riley characterizes Shelter as a “parable about the
fragility of faith and the necessity of belief, when nothingness and
doom are everything.”6 As a society, we have “fragile faith” in the
power of anti-psychotic drugs to be a “salvation” that ameliorates
lives of persons in institutions. All too often, to patients, such drugs
are seen as a “lethal dose,” administered in an atmosphere of “nothingness and doom.” I write this paper, in part, in a preliminary exploration of some hidden issues, the resolution of which may better
illuminate whether institutional drugging can ever offer “shelter
from the storm.”
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ATTITUDES
There has been, it is true, some attention paid in recent years to important questions of empirical data–to what extent the hospital staff
complies with court orders; how many patients actually wish to refuse
anti-psychotic medication; to what extent they are representative of all
patients; the impact that refusal has on treatment; the economic factors
involved–but little of this data appears to have had any significant impact on the law and on the policy in this area. And this is even more surprising than it might otherwise be, given the especially impressive body
of literature by the MacArthur Foundation’s Network on Mental Health
and the Law that touches on these issues.7 As I will discuss below, the
astounding lack of attention paid to this body of literature is perhaps the
most powerful evidence of our societal dis-ease with this entire issue.
8

Staff Compliance

The degree to which institutional staff feels compelled to comply
with judicial mandates–through the moral imperative of the court order,
through moral suasion, or in response to the directives of supervisory
personnel–is the “joker” in any assessment of the extent to which there
will be compliance with equitable court orders involving institutional
conditions. In right-to-refuse-treatment cases–where lower-level staff
have frequently been singled out by courts for its inappropriate “treatment” of patients9–staff compliance becomes both more speculative
and more critical.
A commentator10 has pointed out, “[m]ental hospital staffs that adamantly oppose a judicial decree are in an excellent position to undermine it,”11 noting that, in New Jersey, “doctors at every level–including
the Division of Mental Health directorate–ignored and subverted the
rules.”12 Yet another commentator13 has suggested that some of the
noncompliance might have been caused by passive-aggressive behavior
on the part of the defendants themselves.14
Patients’ Wishes to Refuse

15

In the course of his precedent-shattering opinion establishing a
broad-based right to refuse treatment, Judge Stanley Brotman looked
carefully at this issue from the perspective of the patient:
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The author of one study noted, “schizophrenics have been asked
every question except, ‘How does the medication agree with you?’
Their response is worth listening to.”16
Some empirical evidence has begun to emerge. In one clinical study,
Drs. Paul Appelbaum and Thomas Guthiel divided refusers into three
groupings–situational refusers, stereotypic refusers, and symptomatic
refusers17–and concluded that only for the symptomatic group18 “did
the act of refusal result in serious clinical consequences.”19 Subsequent
studies analyzed ten refusing patients (out of 1,187 total admissions in a
150-bed community mental health center) and concluded that, while
there were some economic consequences of refusal (as a result of longer
periods of hospitalization), on at least one scale–length of time out of
hospital before readmission–the refusers “did . . . better” than a control
group.20 These researchers suggested that the refuser’s success might
have been a result of a “healthy skepticism” that they retained “about
doctors, medicine, and psychiatry and some sense of themselves as not
without power and control over their lives.”21
Other research is in accord. Empirical surveys demonstrate that half
the patients discharged from short-stay treatment programs (including
one conducted at an Ivy League medical school’s teaching hospital) did
not know the name or the appropriate dosage of the anti-psychotic medications prescribed for them or why they were being asked to take these
medications,22 and other studies confirm patients’ lack of knowledge
about their medication regimen.23 At least one court has considered the
potential significance of such knowledge in the formulation of a constitutionally based right to refuse treatment doctrine, reasoning:
A prisoner’s right to refuse treatment is useless without knowledge
of the proposed treatment. Prisoners have a right to such information
as is reasonably necessary to make an informed decision to accept or
reject proposed treatment, as well as a reasonable explanation of the
viable alternative treatments that can be made available in a prison
setting.24
25

Characteristics of Treatment Refusers

Since Appelbaum and Gutheil’s first study on treatment refusers,26 the group of researchers that studied treatment refusal in Minnesota27 has also compared the clinical conditions of refusers to drug
consenters.28 They found that the refusers were no more assaultive than
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consenters, that they were less often diagnosed as having schizophrenia,
but more often as having manic-depressive or schizoaffective illnesses.29
Awareness of Professionals

30

Finally, empirical research has begun on the important, but frequently hidden, question of professional awareness of the law governing the right to refuse treatment.31 Two years after the State of New
York promulgated a regulation dealing with a patient’s right to refuse,32
20% of psychiatric residents responding to a survey did not know it existed, 75% had never seen a copy of it, and 61% did not know of the existence of an appeal process through which a refusing patient could seek
to have the right implemented.33
The surveyors–both lawyers/doctors–found these results to be “particularly disturbing” since they came in a state with both a “precise regulation” and a tradition of “strong patient advocacy.”34 In addition,
other survey results–indicating that doctors who had actually seen the
regulation were more comfortable with the practice of informing patients of their rights than those with only a partial knowledge of the regulation, but those with partial knowledge were less comfortable than
those with a “total lack of awareness”35–suggested that, in the area of
the right to refuse treatment, “a little knowledge is worse than none.”36
Finally, at least one commentator has read the available evidence to
show that psychiatric opposition to treatment refusal, at its base, is not
really premised on the extent to which patients chose to refuse. Rather,
it arises from their (psychiatrists’) defense against challenges to their
professional and institutional autonomy, an opposition to what they perceive as legal interference in their work, and their belief that this responsibility is a joint one: to the community and patient’s family, as well as
to the patient.37
The MacArthur Study

38

For the past decade, the MacArthur Foundation’s Network on Mental
Health and the Law has conducted an extensive study of three areas that
are essential to an informed understanding of mental disability law:
competence, coercion, and risk.39 Among the Network’s findings of
significance is the conclusion that mental patients are not always incompetent to make rational decisions, and that mental patients are not
inherently more incompetent than non-mentally ill patients;40 In fact, on
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“any given measure of decisional abilities, the majority of patients with
schizophrenia did not perform more poorly than other patients and non
patients.”41 In short, the presumption in which courts have regularly engaged–that there is both a de facto and a de jure presumption of incompetency to be applied to medication decisionmaking42–appears to be
based on an empirical fallacy.
It is probably not an exaggeration to say that this is the most significant body of such research developed in the 30 years since “mental disability law” has become a discrete area of legal practice. Yet, courts–
state and federal, civil, and criminal–continue to ignore this evidence,
and consistently fail to incorporate it into case decisions.43
COUNSEL

44

The assumption that individuals facing involuntary civil commitment are globally represented by adequate counsel is an assumption of a
fact not in evidence.45 The data suggests that, in many jurisdictions,
such counsel is woefully inadequate–disinterested, uninformed, roleless, and often hostile.46 A model of “paternalism/best interests” is substituted for a traditional legal advocacy position, and this substitution is
rarely questioned.47 Few courts have ever grappled with adequacy of
counsel questions in this context; fewer yet have found assigned involuntary civil commitment to be inadequate.48
The question of adequacy of counsel in the context of involuntary
civil commitment has at least been subject to some scholarly attention.49
There is scant literature, however, that addresses the question of the
availability and adequacy of counsel in right to refuse medication hearings.50 This near-total lack of attention is even more striking when juxtaposed with the extensive scholarship that has developed discussing
the law reform/test case litigation that led directly to the judicial articulation of a right to refuse treatment.51
Lawyers representing individuals with mental disabilities must familiarize themselves with information about the right to refuse treatment, both as to the law and as to the pharmacology.52 The track record
of lawyers representing persons with mental disabilities has ranged
from indifferent to wretched;53 in one famous survey, lawyers were so
bad that a patient had a better chance of being released at a commitment
hearing if he appeared pro se.54 Further, simply educating lawyers about
psychiatric technique and psychological nomenclature does not materially improve lawyers’ performance where underlying attitudes are not
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changed.55 If counsel is to become even minimally competent in this
area, it is critical that the underlying issues here be confronted.56 This is
underscored by judges’ lack of basic knowledge about mental disability
law; in one astonishing case, a Louisiana civil commitment order was
reversed where the trial court did not even know of the existence of a
state-mandated Mental Health Advocacy service.57 If lawyers continue
to so abdicate their advocacy role, it is not surprising that so many areas
of application of the right to refuse treatment remain judicially unexplored.
Like other legal rights, the right to refuse treatment is not self-executing.58 A statement by a state supreme court or a federal court of appeals
that a patient has a “qualified right to refuse treatment” does not, in and
of itself, automatically translate into a coherent structure through which
hearings are scheduled, counsel appointed, and hearing procedures established. Of the important right to refuse cases, only Rivers v. Katz establishes any mechanism for the appointment of counsel in individual
right to refuse cases;59 Rennie v. Klein, one of the first federal cases
finding a substantive constitutional right to refuse originally mandated
the appointment of counsel,60 but later receded from this position and
required only the presence of “Patient Advocates” (employees of the
state Division of Mental Health and Hospitals) to serve as “informal
counsel to patients who wish to refuse [anti-psychotic medication].” 61
A handful of statutes mandate the application of counsel in right to
refuse treatment hearings;62 on the other hand, at least one court has
held that failure to appoint counsel is not reversible error.63 And only a
few cases have spoken to the role or scope of counsel at medication
hearings.64 Although more courts are beginning to articulate the criteria
to be considered at a medication refusal hearing,65 this level of specificity is simply not present in the assessment of the role and responsibilities of counsel.66
Without such an articulation of specificity, the authentic meaning of
a “right to refuse” remains murky. A right without a remedy67 is no right
at all; worse, a right without a remedy is meretricious and pre-textual–it
gives the illusion of a right without any legitimate expectation that the
right will be honored.68 This is especially significant in light of the research in procedural justice done by Professor Tom Tyler that individuals subject to involuntary civil commitment hearings, like all other
citizens, are affected by such process values as participation, dignity,
and trust, and that experiencing arbitrariness in procedure leads to “social malaise and decreases people’s willingness to be integrated into the
polity, accepting its authorities, and following its rules.”69 And subse-
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quent research by Dr. Hoge and Prof. Feucht-Haviar provides further
empirical support for Prof. Tyler’s insights. Their study of long-term
psychiatric patients found, in an informed consent context, that “capable patient involvement is an important check on a physician’s judgment.”70
Empirical surveys consistently demonstrate that the quality of counsel “remains the single most important factor in the disposition of involuntary civil commitment cases.”71 Certainly, the presence of adequate
counsel is of critical importance in the disposition of right to refuse
treatment cases as well. What’s more, the research makes clear that jurisdictions are wildly inconsistent in the implementation of the right to
refuse laws in general, especially with regard to the specific issue of the
provision of counsel, both from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and within
jurisdictions.72
Again, these findings take on even more importance when considered in the context of the findings by the MacArthur Research Network73 (as discussed above) that mental patients are not always incompetent to make rational decisions, and are not inherently more incompetent than non-mentally ill medical patients.74 Yet, what Prof. Winick
refers to as “Nineteenth Century notions equating mental illness with
incompetence,”75 still, in practice, “continue to influence legal rules and
practices in this area.”76
If judges uncritically conflate institutionalization with incompetency,
lack of meaningful counsel–to structure statutory, case law-based, and
empirical arguments–may be fatal to the patient’s case.77 The mere existence of counsel on behalf of institutionalized mental patients is often invisible to trial courts78; certainly, there is no reason for optimism about
judicial knowledge or interest in this area of the law, absent aggressive,
advocacy-focused counsel.
If ward psychiatrists demonstrate a propensity to make equivalent
“incompetent” with “makes bad decisions” and to assume, in the face of
conflicting statutory and case law, that incompetence in decision making
can be presumed from the fact of institutionalization,79 lack of counsel–to
inquire into the bases of these views on cross-examination, and to demonstrate to the court that they are dissonant with established case and
statutory law–may similarly make the legal process an illusory safeguard. And, as part of that right to counsel should come a right to independent expert assistance.80
In spite of the impressive body of case law outlined above, the existence of a right to refuse treatment remains enigmatic–at best–for many
clinicians.81 Some are resistant, arguing–unsuccessfully in court, but,
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perhaps, more successfully in clinical practice–that the existence of the
right is destructive; certainly, the provocative titles of early articles
written by prominent forensic psychiatrists about the right to refuse
treatment suggest a basic tension that may not be resolvable absent sensitive articulation of the underlying legal concepts.82
CONCLUSION
I have written extensively about the impact of sanism83 and
pretextuality84 on our right-to-refuse-treatment jurisprudence.85 Consider the relevant issues:86
• the attitudes of trial judges towards patients;
• the attitudes of counsel towards patients;
• the implication of courts’ articulating expansive remedies in right
to refuse class action litigation, without making provision of counsel to represent patients in individualized cases;
• the assignment of non-specialized counsel and uneducated judges
to represent patients in right to refuse cases;
• the failure of appellate courts to take seriously the pro forma quality and nature of hearings in many instances;
• the propensity of decision makers to make equivalent “incompetent” with “makes bad decisions” and to assume, in face of statutory and case law, that incompetence in decision making can be
presumed from the fact of institutionalization;
• the perception of a positive relationship between implementation
of the right to refuse and failed deinstitutionalization policies; and
• the perception of drugs as the only “cure” for dangerousness.87
Each of these issues must be considered. If sanist trial judges assume
that patients are incompetent (and thus discredit their testimony), the
entire enterprise may be doomed to failure, and any hearings will become little more than empty shells. What difference will the MacArthur
Network Study’s recommendations make–as to the ability of these patients to engage in autonomous medication-choice decision making–if
trial judges simply ignore patients’ testimony? If sanist counsel similarly disparage their clients’ stories–or, just as inappropriately, present
them to the court with an overt or covert “wink” that asks the judge to
share in a complicitous sham (suggesting that the lawyer is simply par-
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ticipating in what he sees as a charade)88–then, again, the potential impact of the Study’s findings is seriously compromised.89
If appellate courts enter broad orders in right to refuse cases without
thinking about the operationalization of these orders in subsequent individual cases (or if only perfunctory assignment of disinterested counsel
is made),90 the initial order becomes little more than a pretext. And if
other appellate courts close their eyes to the level of inadequacy of counsel, this “willful blindness” simply adds one extra layer of pretextuality to
the process.
Finally, we need to consider some other underlying social issues. The
common wisdom is clear here. Drugs serve two major purposes of social control: They “cure” dangerousness, and they are the only assurance that some deinstitutionalized patients can remain free in
community settings.91 Both of these assumptions are reflected in the
case law that has developed in individual involuntary civil commitment
cases (in which a judge’s perception of the likelihood that an individual
will self-medicate becomes the critical variable in case dispositions);92
they are also reflected in the public discourse that is heard in classrooms, hospital corridors, and courtrooms.
Neither of these assumptions has any basis in science or in law. Yet,
without counsel to serve as a brake–to ask questions, to challenge assumptions, to identify faux “ordinary common sense”93 to point out the
dangerous pitfalls of heuristic thinking94–these assumptions will continue to dominate and control the disposition of individual right to refuse treatment cases, notwithstanding the MacArthur Network Study’s
recommendations.
Again, counsel’s significance increases even more drastically here in
the context of the improper “presumption of incompetency” discussed
earlier. Professor Winick suggests, “Unless a parens patriae commitment statute requires an individualized determination of incompetence
to engage in hospital admission decision making, it would seem deficient as a matter of substantive due process.”95 Without vigorous, independent counsel, it is doubtful that such challenges would ever be
launched. This is especially problematic in light of the fact that the
equation of incompetency to mental illness does appear consonant with
“ordinary common sense.”96 Counsel’s role is especially important in
areas of the law where “ordinary common sense” is so dissonant with
empirical fact. If there is any expectation that these issues be considered
thoughtfully and critically, it is essential that the issue of counsel presence and adequacy be moved to center stage.
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Few–if any–areas of mental disability law have been subject to as
much critical analysis as the question of the right to refuse treatment.
Yet, surprisingly, scant attention has been paid to two critical sub-topics–attitudes and advocacy–the resolution of which will have a significant (perhaps dispositive) impact on the way that the right is operationalized in hospitals and courtrooms both in high-impact and in “invisible” cases.97 Returning to the Dylan lyric that gave rise to this paper’s title, anti-psychotic medications have been ballyhooed as “salvations” and they have been critiqued as providing little more than a “lethal dose.”98 But this debate cannot be resolved until we look carefully
at the issues raised here. For if we do not deal frontally with issues of attitudes and issues of advocacy, the law of right to refuse treatment remains a pretext.99 Only when they are resolved will we be able to
tentatively predict whether state hospital drugging ever can provide, in
Dylan’s words, again, “shelter from the storm.”
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